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Cultures, Conditions, and Cognitive Closure: Breaking
Intelligence Studies’ Dependence on Security Studies
Abstract
This paper is about how the conceptualization of ‘culture’ in intelligence studies has taken
on too powerful a role, one that has become too restrictive in its impact on thinking about
other intelligence communities, especially non-Western ones. This restriction brings about
unintentional cognitive closure that damages intelligence analysis. The argument leans
heavily in many ways on the fine work of Desch and Johnston in the discipline of Security
Studies, who cogently brought to light over fifteen years ago how ultra-popular cultural
theories were best utilized as supplements to traditional realist approaches, but were not
in fact capable of supplanting or replacing realist explanations entirely. The discipline of
Intelligence Studies today needs a similar ‘intellectual intervention’ as it has almost
unknowingly advanced in the post-Cold War era on the coattails of Security Studies but has
largely failed to apply the same corrective measures. This effort may be best accomplished
by going back to Snyder in the 1970s who warned that culture should be used as the
explanation of last resort for Security Studies.
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Introduction
This article is about how a specific conceptualization of ‘culture’ in
intelligence studies, amongst scholars at first but subsequently practitioners
as well, has taken on too powerful a role, one that has become too restrictive
on thinking about other intelligence communities, especially non-Western
ones. This restriction brings about unintentional cognitive closure that
hinders analysis, whether that be with the intelligence professional or the
intelligence professor. My argument leans heavily on the fine work of Desch
and Johnston in Security Studies, who brought to light over fifteen years ago
how ultra-popular cultural theories were best utilized as supplements to
traditional realist approaches but were not in fact capable of supplanting or
replacing realist explanations entirely.1 Intelligence Studies today needs a
similar ‘intellectual intervention:’ As seen later in the case study section,
perhaps the gravest consequence of all isn’t a concern about methodological
or research model clarity, but rather the damage this all-encompassing
conceptualization impacts the very cognitive processes of scholars and
practitioners themselves, creating analyses that are too mystically untestable
when simpler and cleaner analysis is available.
This call for a ‘Deschian’ intellectual intervention similar to the one that took
place within Security Studies more than fifteen years ago offers Intelligence
Studies a chance to differentiate itself from its ‘big brother’ and further
solidify its place as a distinct academic discipline. Indeed, the emphasis on
grand strategic cultures made sense within Security Studies (with careful
restrictions as to when most appropriate), but goes against common sense
when too dominant within Intelligence Studies. As a discipline, Intelligence
Studies too often follows the lead of Security Studies when it would be wiser
to navigate a separate path. The analytical conceptualization of culture is one
of those prime opportunities. Ironically, this may be accomplished best by
going back to a foundational premise in Security Studies during the 1970s
that has lost some of its influential luster: Snyder’s warning that culture
grandly defined should be used as an explanation of last resort.2

Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,’
International Security 23/1 (1998) pp. 141-170 and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking
about Strategic Culture,’ International Security 19/4 (1995) pp. 32-64.
2 For the best explicit contextualization of this, see Edward Lock, ‘Refining Strategic
Culture: Return of the Second Generation,’ Review of International Studies 36 (2010) pp.
685-708.
1
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The present work will first analyze the two traditions within the literature.
From there six ‘case study glances’ will be offered to show how the positive
and negative traditions amongst scholars and practitioners alike have
produced dramatically different approaches and conclusions about foreign
intelligence organizations. In all, China, North Korea, Russia, Romania,
Turkey, and Spain will be highlighted. The insights garnered will then bring
in contemporary discussions about transforming and adapting intelligence
studies and how the present argument could be a positive influence on that
process. Finally, two empirical examples (the emergence of radical Islam in
the 1990s and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014) will be used to show
how dangerous cognitive closure, caused by grand strategic culture, can be
when examining the American intelligence community and how approaches
focusing on organizational culture would have been more powerful.
In the early literature within Intelligence Studies there were two traditions of
‘culture’ which, while affiliated with each other, were still quite distinct. The
more prevalent version dealt with intelligence culture (i.e., as it was practiced
by actual intelligence professionals) more in the manner of organizational
culture, with its commensurate corporate-like elaborations. A second broader
version co-existed alongside this, tied more intimately with the concept of a
country’s strategic culture grandly defined. This version had intelligence
cultures as a fairly accurate mimic or mirror of the greater strategic national
culture. Every country’s strategic culture was seen as inevitably unique, tied
together by a complex web of language, history, local custom, religion, and
ethnicity. In time, Intelligence Studies as a discipline shifted from that more
humble and explicit conceptualization of culture to the latter, grander one
that is inherently mysterious and semi-knowable, as it relies on more esoteric
and highly subjective characteristics.
The consequence is important: This ambiguous conceptualization can actually
cause scholars and practitioners alike to get bogged down searching for the
‘intrinsic essences’ of a grand strategic culture when all they should rightly
focus on is how national security priorities can evolve. This article argues
these shifts are more powerful explanatory factors for determining state
security behavior. It is very much like a corporate mindset. For some reason
Intelligence Studies over time has deemphasized this simple reality and made
understanding the priorities of intelligence communities more dependent on
considering a state’s unique grand strategic culture. For example, countries
like Russia or Iran are always interpreted through more esoteric, almost
philosophical positions related to Soviet empire nostalgia or Ayatollah
chauvinism, rather than considering the very real likelihood that their
25
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respective intelligence communities operate in a similar manner to the
American, prizing pragmatic, unambiguous information. This process is
fascinatingly similar to the cognitive closure discussed by Hatlebrekke and
Smith.3 In short, emphasizing ‘grand strategic cultures’ to understand foreign
intelligence agencies induces its own cognitive closure amongst scholars and
practitioners alike.
Thus, the argument here is both a gentle rebuke against how the concept of
grand strategic culture has evolved to dominate the field and a plea to return
to the more accurate tradition of corporate-like organizational culture as a
primary independent variable for examining intelligence communities. The
proposal here is to adopt the term ‘condition’ to represent the organizational
concept of culture and allow the grand strategic concept of culture to
maintain its naming rights. This piece hopes to create more open
discussions within intelligence studies as a discipline that include multiple
explanatory frameworks and the creation of a free and vibrant exchange of
ideas about how culture is viewed and applied as both an analytical
concept within the discipline and how intelligence professionals engage
(and do not engage) it. To understand intelligence communities, one need
not be a prophet of a country’s particular and parochial grand strategic
culture. Rather, the need is to focus on the dynamic organizational conditions
that evolve, create friction, and produce change—sometimes slowly,
sometimes quickly—within the intelligence community agencies in question.

Grand Strategic Culture and Intelligence Studies: Fighting the
Deus Ex Machina
Examining the impact of culture on intelligence is in actuality not a recent
investigation. Bonthous specifically tackled the issue over two decades ago.4
Unfortunately, that work showed the dichotomy that would come to
epitomize the treatment of culture within Intelligence Studies overall.
Indeed, on the one hand it discusses briefly that cultures can and do evolve
and as such lead to intelligence practices that also adapt and change. But the
concession is rather quickly overwhelmed by grand strategic culture by
testifying to its power as something shared “across religions, levels of
education, social networks, companies and industries...even transcending

Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke and M.L.R. Smith, ‘ Towards a New Theory of Intelligence
Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure,’ Intelligence and
National Security 25/2 (2010) pp. 147-182.
4 J. M. Bonthous, ‘Understanding intelligence across cultures’, International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7/3 (1994) pp. 7–34.
3
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ethnic groups” and as such will inevitably foster or inhibit intelligence.5 Thus,
the influence of national culture on intelligence will only become more
important over time and in that Bonthous helped propel a self-fulfilling
prophecy within Intelligence Studies. The justification for this premise is
based on how ‘national culture’ was ultimately defined:
“Culture is the one element that weaves a homogeneous social fabric
and survives mergers, acquisitions, and cross-border
standardizations…Culture has deep, permanent roots in language,
which, from birth, encodes images, concepts, and patterns of thinking
into the people…Throughout life, both language and culture serve as a
means of perceiving, representing and relating: hence the importance
of language in shaping culture and the importance of culture in
shaping intelligence.”6
It would be natural to think this ebullient description was just a consequence
of culture’s fame and popularity across many different disciplines in the early
1990s, especially Security Studies. But this does not hold when the work of
Duyvesteyn in 2011 is taken into consideration.7 Nearly two decades later, the
other primary peer-reviewed journal in the discipline dedicated an entire
special issue to what was now called ‘strategic culture’ and its impact on
intelligence writ large. Duyvesteyn’s enthusiasm, if anything, exceeded the
original ebullience of Bonthous:
“Strategic culture can be read from a whole list and combination of
sources: geography, climate, resources, history, experience, political
structure, nature of organizations involved, myths and symbols, key
texts and documents that inform actors of the appropriate action,
transnational norms, generational change, and the role of technology.
There are several custodians of strategic culture, such as elites,
political institutions, public opinion, popular culture, and civil
society.”8
The problem with the above formulation should be clear: The evolution of the
concept from ‘national culture’ to ‘strategic culture’ has basically created a
deus ex machina in Intelligence Studies. We have come to define culture so
Ibid. p.8.
Ibid.
7 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations,’
Intelligence and National Security 26/4 (2011) pp. 521-530.
8 Ibid. p. 524.
5

6
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broadly and grandly that nearly everything analyzed has fallen beyond its
event horizon. Using such a definition creates several research nightmares:
how are competing variables controlled? How are the multiple causal
variables above parsed out and made distinct? How can any explanation
based on such conceptualization be falsifiable? Perhaps the gravest
consequence of all isn’t so much about methodology or rigor, but the negative
impact this esoteric conceptualization has on the very cognitive processes of
scholars and practitioners, creating analyses that are too reliant on semimystical characterizations when simpler and less ambiguous investigations
are available.
Even more fascinating, the tendency to ‘qualify but elevate’ continues:
Duyvesteyn herself declares that not enough work has been done on culture
within intelligence and that while “the concept of culture is
undisputed…many now prefer to see it as a context for understanding rather
than possessing a clear causal and linear relationship with human behavior.”9
Just as with Bonthous two decades before, Intelligence Studies today tends to
qualify the causal power of grand strategic culture only to then envelope all
analysis under its banner. This is why some scholarly work needs to be
reclaimed back into the more subtle organizational camp. The most
exemplary work of this kind belongs to Davies and what he has done on
British and American intelligence. Most scholars have taken his work to
represent an affirmation of grand strategic culture when in fact its highest
power comes from an organizational cultural approach:
“Philip Davies has concluded in his study of intelligence cultures in the
United States and the United Kingdom that the culture of the British
intelligence apparatus tends toward an integrative intelligence culture,
while the American intelligence culture could be more accurately
characterized as disintegrative. These distinctive cultures are prone to
specific weak points; integrative cultures are highly sensitive to
groupthink and disintegrative cultures to turf wars.”10
Davies is rather explicit in not trying to make his conclusions grandly cultural
from a strategic perspective. It is the subsequent scholarly citations of his
work that place him in the grand culture camp. But instead of highlighting
amorphous and undefined distinctive cultures (language often used in the

9

Ibid. p. 521.
Ibid. pp. 526-527.

10
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grand strategic tradition), the discoveries of Davies are better understood
through organizational structure.
Might the highly disintegrative tendencies of American intelligence,
commensurate with the danger of turf wars, be accounted for more powerfully
and explicitly by looking at its massive size subdivided into seventeen
competing intelligence agencies? Might the integrative trends within British
intelligence, commensurate with the dangers of groupthink, be accounted for
more readily and clearly by its lack of compartmentalization and segregation?
The corporate organizational structure of the intelligence communities
themselves is integrative and disintegrative. The so-called grand strategic
cultures of the two respective countries are not nearly as explanatory without
leaps of logic.
This tendency happens again and again in Intelligence Studies, where
scholars claim to not necessarily be beholden to a grand strategic cultural
approach, but then spend an inordinate amount of time being just that:
“Strategic culture is of course a very broad concept but it very well
suits the treatment of intelligence problems…The main sources of
strategic culture are amongst others history, experience, political
structure, myths and symbols, key texts, resources and technology.
There are several main keepers of strategic culture such as elites,
political institutions, public opinion, civil society, and popular
culture.”11
The important piece by Aldrich and Kasuku superbly affirms the somewhat
spastic inconsistency with which the discipline tries to deal with culture.
Beginning with the noble cause of freeing the West from its self-imposed
constraint of an ethnocentric Anglo-Saxon conception of intelligence, the
piece confesses to the difficulty of creating new models. What is missed is
that this difficulty is based not just on a search for new models but for new
‘grand strategic cultural’ models, just ones that aren’t ethnocentrically AngloSaxon. They admit that culture is a slippery concept but acquiesce to the fact
that the notion of ‘strategic cultures commands wide consensus.’12 This
consensus has a stranglehold on Intelligence Studies:
Joop Van Reijn, ‘Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Essays on American and British
Praxis since the Second World War,’ Intelligence and National Security 26/4 (2011) p.
442.
12 Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku, ‘Escaping from American Intelligence: culture,
ethnocentrism, and the Anglosphere,’ International Affairs, 88/5 (2012) p. 1014
11
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“Culture constrains how we think our intelligence institutions relate to
a globalizing world, what tasks we think they should perform and what
we think intelligence might be. In this wider sense, we are all
potentially prisoners in the ethnocentric dungeon…Culture is partly
about difference, and each intelligence community has its own unique
interface with national strategy. Appreciating the importance of
associated norms and values is central to understanding how they
function.”13
The very voices claiming culture’s uncertain impact within intelligence go on
to produce research that is an affirmation of culture’s power. Perhaps more
problematic, the axiomatic acceptance of culture is analytically omnivorous –
devouring everything and blocking efforts to offer alternatives that are less
grand but more empirically explanatory. Thankfully, there are other voices.
There is a significant but small counter-literature that holds great promise in
pushing less grand cultural theories of intelligence.

Organizational Conditions in Intelligence Studies: A
Foundation to Build Upon
The work of Desch and Johnston in the mid-1990s figure most prominently as
cautionary warnings issued to the Strategic Studies discipline. First, for
Desch, cultural variables were tricky to define and operationalize; second,
some cultural theorists believed that cultural variables make every case sui
generis, and so the theories cannot be broadly generalized or applicable
across many cases; third, cultural theories did not outperform ‘hard cases’ in
comparison to realist theories, which was essential if cultural approaches
really were going to become the go-to approach in Security Studies.14 The
dilemma for Desch of cultural vs. realist theories matches up well with the
present concern about grand strategic cultures vs. organizational conditions.
While Security Studies did indeed wish to produce general theories of security
behavior writ large, it is not rational to think a similar general theory of
intelligence community behavior can or even should be developed globally.
Desch’s central problem with cultural theories is the same problem with how
Intelligence Studies scholars tend to use grand strategic cultural approaches
to explain foreign intelligence community agencies: These approaches are not
Ibid. pp. 1016, 1027.
Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security
Studies,’ International Security 23/1 (1998) pp. 141-170.
13

14
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better, nor more complete, nor provide more accurate explanations on
behavior.
This holds even more powerfully with the work of Johnston, whose mid-90s
review of strategic culture revealed it to be both under-determined and overdetermined simultaneously and unable to offer a convincing research design
for isolating actual causal effects.15 Indeed, his warning that the link between
strategic culture and behavior needed to be handled with extreme care
(because there had been no success in revealing a direct link between the two)
is prescient:
“Most of those who use the term ‘culture’ tend to argue, explicitly or
implicitly, that different states have different predominant strategic
preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the
state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political,
cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.
Ahistorical or ‘objective’ variables such as technology, polarity, or
relative materials capabilities are all of secondary importance. It is
strategic culture, they argue, that gives meaning to these variables [but
offer no real evidence to support the supposition.]”16
Consequently, an analytical calculus cannot be provided that compellingly
shows the relationship between culture and behavioral choice.17 Thus
analyses within Intelligence Studies, when based on grand strategic cultural
approaches, will always be a bit too deterministic and tautological (i.e., the
French do that because they are French and the French have always been that
way).
This fits perfectly with the concept of cognitive closure by Hatlebrekke and
Smith, who argued brilliantly about the detrimental effect it has specifically
on intelligence analysis:
“It is helpful to understand cognitive closure as the force that
manifests itself as assumptions, orthodoxies, and habits. Anything that
questions or puts these assumptions, orthodoxies and habits under
scrutiny, thus threatens established conceptions of the world.
Cognitive closure is therefore a way in which humans protect
15 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture,’ International Security 19/4
(1995) pp. 32-64.
16 Ibid. p. 34.
17 Ibid. p. 44.
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themselves against any challenge to a secure and comforting
understanding of the world.”18
Hatlebrekke and Smith rightly contended that intelligence organizations
might be able to improve analysis by embracing the uncertainty of reality and
resist the urge to find solutions that would neatly fit inside of preconceived
notions and predetermined orders of emphasis.19
Hume argued that custom is the dominant guide for human life. Hatlebrekke
and Smith connected custom as one of the biggest dangers to human
imagination and therefore one of the greatest dangers to accurate threat
assessment.20 An approach that moves away from grand pronouncements
about immutable culture will best describe the world intelligence
communities actually operate in: One comprised of societies undergoing
dynamic social, political, and economic adjustments, therefore facing threats
that also always change.21 While change, especially rapid change, can be an
inherently difficult thing for intelligence community practitioners and
Intelligence Studies scholars, analytical approaches need to be highly
adaptable, reflective, dynamic, and not prone to ‘custom thinking’ or enduring
orthodoxies. Failing to do that is evidence of how Intelligence Studies as a
discipline and a profession can create its own cognitive closure.
While there is no doubt that Intelligence Studies will always be a close cousin
to Security Studies, with both researching many of the same problems and
concerned about similar dangers and riddles, it is time for Intelligence
Studies to acknowledge that riding the analytical coattails of Security Studies
will not always lead it down the right path for its priorities. Today, Security
Studies is undergoing a reformulation of strategic cultural theory so that
greater relevance is placed on the political practices of those involved in
actual strategy. In other words, instead of arguing that certain states engage
in specific behavior because of their unique and inherent strategic cultures,
many are now calling for a more critical analysis of its own assumptions and
allow for greater investigations into the daily organizational minutiae that

Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke and M.L.R. Smith, “Towards a New Theory of Intelligence
Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure,” Intelligence and
National Security 25/2 (2010) pp. 147-182.
19 Ibid. p. 150.
20 Ibid. p. 180.
21 Ibid.
18
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might impact modern strategy decisions.22 If Security Studies can do this,
then Intelligence Studies certainly must do so as well.

Examining Foreign Intelligence Community Cultures: The
Bipolarity of Intelligence Studies
Common complaints within Intelligence Studies about the examination of
foreign intelligence community agencies, especially those not residing in the
West, run the gamut: Too historically driven; completely ahistorical and thus
nothing more than a simple organizational review of facts and details; too
often inevitably compared against a standard framework that uses either the
United States or the United Kingdom as the backdrop. Such analyses have
failed to look at how competing conceptualizations of culture engender
entirely different approaches and therefore radically different conclusions
about said organizations. This section will give six ‘case glances’ of this
phenomenon, three positive and three negative: China, North Korea, and
Russia on the negative side and Romania, Turkey, and Spain on the positive.
The cases are a mix between scholar- and practitioner-produced, thus
showing this problem is not just the imagination of academics but has bled
into the professional field as well. Perhaps most interesting and unexpected
was how states that play a bigger role on the global stage in terms of security
affairs seem to be more hurt analytically, as grand strategic culture dominates
their analyses and organizational cultural conditions are often never utilized
for evaluations.

Russian Federation
Despite every effort by intelligence officials within the Russian Federation
since the end of the Cold War to instill a new foreign policy strategy and to
instigate new relations based on ideas of multi-polarity and balanced global
power, most American analyses of Russia cannot seem to get past
characterizing every Russian maneuver and interest in a grand strategic
cultural way. When this is done, Russian intelligence is inevitably seen as
aspiring to help the state achieve new ‘great power’ status or attempting to
reconstitute Soviet glory or is subconsciously beholden to an autocratic
instinct that dates even further back, to the czars or even back to Byzantium.23

22 Edward Lock, “Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation,” Review
of International Studies 36 (2010) pp. 685-708.
23 For two exemplary standards of this kind of literature see Norbert Eitelhuber, ‘The
Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the West,” The Quarterly
Journal Winter (2009) pp. 1-28 and K.C. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires: Russia’s
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This type of cognitive closure is detrimental to American intelligence and
diplomacy because it is purposefully limiting the engagement between the two
sides. In many ways the United States, both in terms of its scholarship and
diplomatic efforts, has blindly created self-fulfilling prophecies when it comes
to the Russian Federation because of a repeated inability to see past its own
reliance on grand strategic culture as the chief defining point for
understanding Russians. This is what led outstanding scholars like Samuel
Huntington as early as 1993 to make statements like, ‘if, as the Russians stop
behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like
Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West
could again become distant and conflictual.’24 It is in the same vein that
scholars think the modern day has no real relevance on understanding
Russian foreign policy and national security prioritization. This incredulous
overreliance on ancient culture, where scholars and practitioners alike believe
the roots of all Russian decisions in 2015 require an understanding of the
Russian soul from 500, even 1000, years before, leads American analysts
down a rabbit hole of quasi-mysticism and vague truisms.25 This is why so
many Russian intelligence officials today will privately scoff at American
intelligence analysis about Russia, whether it is from the ivory tower or Foggy
Bottom:
“Of the organization of the Soviet and subsequent Russian state we
can draw no specific indication of Byzantine bureaucratic organization,
but in spirit the way the Soviets organized their government for
security purposes is still quite Russian…the way the Byzantines
managed their security and intelligence was a function of the political
culture of the state, the same political culture that was inherited later
by the Kievan and then Russian state, which has served the Soviet and
subsequent post-Soviet Russian state.”26
The above is truly a common exemplar of the kind of analysis that passes for
grand strategic culture when examining Russian intelligence. Not only are
the arguments non-scientific, they are ultimately spurious: These analyses are
not trying to ascertain the true motivations of contemporary Russian
intelligence decisions. Rather, they are trying to make sure Russia stays
Inheritance of Byzantine Security Culture,” Journal of Slavic Military Culture 23 (2010)
pp. 574-596.
24 Eitelhuber, ‘The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture,” p. 20.
25 K.C. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires,” p. 576.
26 Ibid. p. 591.
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within the historic-cultural frame that already exists. This is cognitive closure
at its worst: The question ‘why do they do what they do?’ transforms instead
into ‘what kind of Russia do we want and how do we make sure it becomes
that and that alone?’27 Grand strategic cultural thinking on Russian
intelligence reveals relatively little about modern Russian thinking for
American analysts, but it reveals a wealth of information on American
thinking for Russian analysts.

North Korea
Some of the more interesting analyses on North Korea are coming out of the
Korean peninsula itself, from native scholars with a personal stake in the
future of the Hermit Kingdom. It is fascinating to see how the pervasive
impact of grand strategic culture has filtered out:
“[To understand North Korea, we] will apply the concept of strategic
culture, which refers to the way a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes,
patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements, and methods of
environmental adaptation [in the face of] threat and use of
force…These beliefs and values emanate from such fundamental
influences as geopolitical setting, history, and political culture. They
collectively constitute a strategic culture that persists over time and
influences the formation and execution of strategy.”28
The problem begins with the analytical tendency to define strategic culture in
such a way that it becomes basically a witches’ brew of so many divergent
variables that one can explain absolutely everything while saying nothing. If
anything the definition of strategic culture above goes even further than some
of the earlier definitions elaborated. But there seems to be the greater
possibility of moving away from grand strategic culture because of the
frustration that it leaves little flexibility for new engagement. In North
Korea’s case some are starting to discuss the concept of ‘comprehensive
security’ so as to incorporate ‘low politics,’ focusing on specific daily tasks and
issue areas.29
The elaboration of comprehensive security is eerily similar to the
organizational cultural conditions approach. Most important is to see Korean
scholars and practitioners declaring ‘strategic culture’ too rigid and
Eitelhuber, ‘The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture,” p. 24.
Yong-Pyo Hong, “North Korea’s Strategic Culture and Threat Perception: Implications
for Regional Security Cooperation,” Korea Observer 42/1 (2011) p. 96-97.
29 Ibid. p. 111.
27

28
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constraining when what is most readily needed is an approach that allows
dynamic complex reality to have more causal sway. The failure to engage
such new approaches is seen as dooming the peninsula to intelligence analysis
that is going to be a vicious circle of negative geopolitical, historical, and
ideological legacies.30

China
Unlike the Korean peninsula, Chinese scholarship seems still interested in the
power of grand strategic culture as an explanation for national security
behavior. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any innovation in how the
Chinese embrace the concept compared to the Americans. Consequently,
Chinese analysis of its own national security and intelligence community
tends to be somewhat incoherent if not cliché:
“China has a long history with 5000 years of splendid civilization…the
year 1840 is a turning point of not only ancient China’s history but also
ancient China’s national security. The year 1949 is another turning
point for China’s national security. Contemporary China is a
continuation of historical China…China’s national security is deeply
affected by her traditional culture and history…China is accustomed to
a set philosophy and standard rules in which to engage and watch the
world…This impacts Chinese thinking, judgment, behavior, as well as
influences China’s national security.”31
Informally, this should be called the Sun-Tzu syndrome: There should be a
challenge in academia for anyone covering Chinese security and intelligence
to write without somehow using a reference to Sun-Tzu as the catch-all
explanation to properly understand the Chinese world view. Again, keep in
mind the important distinction made between Security Studies, where such
grand cultural legacies can and should enter the thinking of scholars, and
Intelligence Studies, where more pragmatic analyses based on corporate
organizational thinking is more powerful for understanding intelligence
agencies. The goal is not to dismiss strategic culture as a concept for all of
academia: rather it is to illustrate how often it gets improperly overused
Ibid. p. 110-111.
Chen Ou, ‘The Characteristics of China’s National Security,’ Journal of Politics and
Law 4/1 (2011) pp. 84; 92. It should be noted that this native piece suffered from poor
written English. I took the liberty of cleaning up the grammar and proper flow of the
English language to make the point of the author more coherent to native English
readers. In no way was the substantive content or analytical argument of the original
author changed or degraded.
30
31
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within Intelligence Studies and subsequently hinders the power and accuracy
of such analyses.
These three ‘case glances’ reveal a stark tendency: countries that have a major
role on the global stage seem to be stuck in the grand strategic cultural trap.
Sometimes this trap is set by others (Russia); other times this trap is largely
set by the countries themselves (North Korea and China). Regardless, the end
result is the same: diatribes about ‘crucially important’ ancient wisdoms and
historical ghosts that do not reveal much empirical insight on actual
contemporary intelligence within said countries. The following three cases all
involve ‘lesser’ countries in terms of their global prominence within security
and intelligence. How they differ, however, proves quite interesting for the
arguments being made here.

Spain
Somehow Spain has managed to avoid the ‘curse of Isabelle and Ferdinand’
when it comes to how it evaluates its own intelligence community. In Spain’s
case, there is remarkable focus on the organizational cultural conditions and
as a result Spanish analysis tends to be more dynamic, adaptable, and
empirically engaged.
“Spain’s IC represents a clear problem of articulation which prevents it
from becoming a satisfactory instrument for elaborating the country’s
foreign and security policy. The existing legal framework in Spain
enables a plurality of formations and evolutions so that in principle
there is no need for a new legal regulation; there is, however, an urgent
need for reflection at the highest level on the model of community that
Spain needs and wants, and its consequent formalization so that all the
actors involved will know what kind of model the Executive wants, the
role to be played by each actor and the mechanisms to be followed for
its coordination and control.”32
The differentiation in language, focus, and execution of analysis could not be
more dramatic. There is no kvetching about lost empire or the need to
somehow honor the enduring spiritual debt of the Spanish Armada. And
make no mistake: the manner in which grand strategic cultural analysis tends
to be used in Intelligence Studies would demand this kind of language. If

32 Antonio M. Diaz Fernandez, “The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality,”
Intelligence and National Security 25/2 (2010) p.242.
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Russia is dependent on the legacy of the Byzantine Empire and China is hardpressed to move beyond the ideas of Sun-Tzu, then it is simply hypocritical to
not make Spain beholden to the same type of historical and cultural legacies.
Yet these native scholars are not beholden to it. What is their main concern
when analyzing the contemporary formulation and future of the Spanish
intelligence community is the laws, human agents, organizations,
contemporary security priorities, and the complex dynamic interplay between
the various vested actors?
When the focus remains tight on these organizational cultural conditions,
scholarship tends to be more empirically accurate, capable of being tested by
others, and open to change (a crucial constant in today’s world of intelligence
community operations). The previous three cases, all overly dependent on
emphasizing grand strategic culture, lacked all of these qualities and as a
result produced analytical results that were less than informative.

Turkey
Turkey intensifies the characteristics seen in the Spanish case. Analyses on
Turkish intelligence tend to be dominated by the ever-changing current and
future developments of the Turkish state. Rather than trying to adhere to
some ancient tract that demands a particular mindset and behavioral tactic,
Turkish intelligence by default must be ready to always adjust and adapt to
the unpredictable domestic and foreign policy winds.
“What intelligence is the Turkish intelligence community interested
in? First and foremost, it is concerned with any intelligence that would
contribute to national security and public safety. A second interest is
solid intelligence that would support Turkey’s active role and interest
in balancing the influence of Iran and Russia in the Balkan, Middle
Eastern, and Caucasian triangle, which is the primary focus of Turkey’s
regional security policies. Third, it is seeking good quality foreign
intelligence to allow the government to have a modicum of
international influence.”33
Just as with Spain, Turkey emphasizes the now when it evaluates and
assesses its intelligence community. There is no point droning on about the
legacy of the Ottoman Empire or the spirit of Ataturk or what it historically
means to be the Western-Eastern crossroads for humanity. These cultural
Stephane Lefebvre, “Turkey’s Intelligence Community in Changing Times,”
International Journal 61/1 (2005-2006) p. 113.
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and historical legacies matter if you are a Turk. But they do not explicitly and
powerfully impact Turkish intelligence as it watches what happens in Syria, or
tries to decide how to respond to the Islamic State, or considers various
overtures from the United States, Israel and the EU on hindering Iranian
nuclear development, or grows weary about a strengthening Kurdish
autonomy in Northern Iraq, just to name several prominent contemporary
examples.
Grand strategic cultural approaches have very little to say to these real-time
dilemmas and it is these priorities that occupy the thinking of Turkish
intelligence today. So, analysis that wants to properly evaluate the national
security decision-making calculus of Turkey is much better off focusing on the
organizational cultural conditions that demand the attention, budget, and
leadership of Turkish intelligence. The explanatory power of these analyses is
in the substantive relevance that can be addressed when not shackled by
ancient historical and cultural legacies. They make for wonderful stories but
not very compelling intelligence product.

Romania
Fascinatingly, Romania seems to be a state that has actually adopted
organizational cultural conditions not simply as an academic approach for
intelligence analysis but as an actual corporate philosophy for its intelligence
community. It recently pushed for developing the cognitive skills of its
intelligence agents, seeking to formalize an educational reform program that
can produce intelligence leaders that have “deep and flexible
multidimensional thinking.”34 The reasoning for this push is that Romanian
intelligence believes the ability to produce creative solutions to complex
operational and strategic problems is hugely impactful for reducing future
conflicts.35 Romanian intelligence has made a direct causal link between
organizational culture and proper cognitive functioning that should be the
envy of Intelligence Studies scholars:
“Specific cognitive skills require critical evaluation of the results of
new research, the formulation of alternative understandings and the
demonstration of relevance, including the creative application of
research methods and the design and management of domain-specific
processes…The fundamentals of organizational culture [that we apply

Constantin Stan and George Negru, “Culture of Intelligence and the Training of the
Intelligence Officers,” National Defence University Special Report (2012) pp. 167-173.
35 Ibid. p. 170.
34
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to future intelligence officers] should be based on the progressive
transformation of our leaders so that we institutionalize such training
in terms of conceptual and decision-making factors so that we exhibit
interdisciplinary thinking that is fast, adaptable, proactive, open,
flexible, and unconventional...”36
The last sentence epitomizes why this approach is superior to grand strategic
cultural concerns for Intelligence Studies: Any intelligence community
operating around the world today would testify to the importance of being
fast, adaptable, proactive, and flexible. It is the inability to be such things that
leads to intelligence failure. So it should not be surprising that the inability to
be that intellectually also leads to faulty or imprecise research within
Intelligence Studies.
What these cases powerfully exposed was the dramatic difference in analytical
end-product: An emphasis on grand strategic culture will make for better
reading, as one is taken down a road of the most interesting historical
impacts, sometimes going back thousands of years. Organizational cultural
conditions will instead examine budget concerns, internal turf wars over
specific issue-areas, and the changing dynamics of micro-subjects that might
not even make the article, let alone an historical novel. But those are the
things that reveal the most about the contemporary prioritizing of intelligence
communities. More importantly, the more powerful intelligence countries are
dominated by grand strategic cultural analyses. Perhaps that is a reason so
little headway is made engaging intelligence communities like China, Russia,
and North Korea.

Hope for the ‘Lesser Culture:’ New Research into Intelligence
Transformation
While this work has shown how quickly cognitive closure occurs within grand
strategic cultural approaches in intelligence analysis, both from a scholarly
and practitioner perspective, both within the United States and far beyond it,
it has also shown that there are counter-approaches being developed to wean
Intelligence Studies off of such overreliance. At the moment, these
approaches are disparate and terminologically diverse, which actually
prevents scholars from realizing they are working within the same school of
thought. But there have been in the last half dozen years some stirrings on
this front which will hopefully continue to grow and advance. If successful, it

36

Ibid. p. 172.
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will emphasize the power of purpose-based decision-making rather than
predetermined thought-processes for intelligence analysis and research.
The work of an intelligence community is by default messy. Not only does it
normally have to tackle extremely diverse, even radically contradictory,
threats and forces, it usually has to deal with an internal bureaucracy that is
highly compartmentalized.37 It is surprising, therefore, that the effort to
increase efficiency to improve intelligence analysis is really not that old.
Hammond was one of the first to examine the creation, post-9/11, of purposebased centers that were intended to ensure the integration and coordination
of terrorism-related information held anywhere within the intelligence
community.38 But as was seen in Spain and Turkey and Romania, there is a
problem here with semantics: purpose-based is really nothing more than a
shift toward emphasizing organizational cultural conditions over grand
strategic theory. It is the reincorporation of daily foci to a place of
prominence in intelligence evaluation.
This same effort occurred just two years after Hammond’s work in 2009 at
Harvard’s Kennedy School with the Defense Leadership Project. Born out of
the so-called frustration with leadership within the U.S. Intelligence
Community (characterized as routinely being ill-equipped to understand,
visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment), it
found the solution to the problem in adaptation.39 A significant problem
hindering the power of these approaches is the failure to realize how much
they are all about the competing conceptualizations of culture. Cognitive
closure caused by grand strategic culture is what causes leadership to be illequipped to understand the modern environment. This is because grand
strategic culture does not try to evolve with contemporary realities: It tries to
sledgehammer the messy complexity of contemporary reality into its own
historically-predetermined boxes.
To a large extent this piece is trying to affirm Immerman’s work on
transforming analysis and supports his classification of this effort as
something more than just a random series of chance scholarly encounters:

Thomas H. Hammond, “Why is the Intelligence Community so Difficult to Redesign?
Smart Practices, Conflicting Goals, and the Creation of Purpose-Based Organizations,”
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 20/3
(2007) pp. 401-422.
38 Ibid. pp.419-421.
39 Defense Leadership Project, “Transforming the National Security Culture,” Harvard
Kennedy School (2009) pp. 9-35.
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“The movement, and it is a movement, to reform and thereby improve
intelligence analysis goes by the title Analytic
Transformation…Analytic Transformation’s goal is as simple as it is
dramatic: to get the right analysis to the right people at the right time,
in a form they can use. The strategy is equally commonsensical: to
transform the analytic component of our community from a federation
of agencies, or a collection of feudal baronies, into a community of
analysts.”40
The cacophony of diverse terms continues. These efforts to overcome “feudal
baronies, ill-equipped leadership, and face more efficiently a complex messy
reality” are intensified and improved by a switch to the so-called ‘lesser
culture.”41 As Immerman attested to, the transition from bipolarity to
globalization has meant in the intelligence world a switch to new phenomena,
challenges, and threats, many of which are asymmetrical, obscure, highly
evolving, non-traditional, and fast moving.42 The Analytic Transformation
‘movement’ highlighted above is accomplished more competently by focusing
on organizational cultural conditions. These various groups are already
speaking the language of the approach without realizing it.

Conclusion: Stepping Out of the Shadow of Security Studies
What works for scholars within Security Studies will not necessarily work well
for scholars in Intelligence Studies. There are two final examples to share to
illustrate how nefarious and limiting cognitive closure can be when it comes
to the application of culture in intelligence research and analysis: The
American intelligence reaction to the rise of radical Islam in the 1990s,
specifically al-Qaida, and the current conflict today in Eastern Ukraine.
Examining these two incidents show how easy it is to be really smart in
intelligence and still fail.
There are numerous scholarly, diplomatic, and journalistic confirmations
testifying to the fact that the United States always had ample opportunity to
understand the threat Usama bin Laden (UBL) and al-Qaida represented to
the country. While this ‘intelligence failure’ has been examined from
numerous sides - communication gaps, bureaucratic infighting, turf wars—
what has been largely ignored is the fact that America’s national myopia on

Richard H. Immerman, ‘Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community’s Best
Kept Secret,’ Intelligence and National Security 26/2-3 (2011) p.163.
41 Ibid. p. 165.
42 Ibid.
40
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this issue can be cogently explained by its over-reliance on grand strategic
culture. This dictated that America was impervious to any external terrorist
threat. This is only more bitterly ironic (and affirmation of how
psychologically deep grand strategic cultural cognitive closure can go) given
that the ‘failed’ 1993 World Trade Center attack was a failure simply because
it did not succeed in leveling the building. Analysts seem to have ignored the
success of actually gaining access to and detonating an explosive device within
its grounds. If intelligence analysts had focused on the more organizational
cultural conditions, then all of the aforementioned information could have
gained greater focus and relevance and the ‘success’ aspect of the 1993
operation would have triggered much greater investigation.
This analytical blind spot in intelligence has been documented for some time
but never connected before to the concept of cognitive closure. Studies going
as far back as Pearl Harbor have shown that the country attacked has almost
always had in its possession ample early intelligence that, given a different
analytical approach and mindset, would have enabled the possibility of setting
up a defense or counterintelligence operation.43 And while Intelligence
Studies as a discipline has not viewed the rise of al-Qaida in the 1990s from
this perspective, it seems rather powerful in explaining why the relevance of
so much was simply ignored: the first 1993 attack; the official UBL
declaration of war against the United States in the mid-1990s; and the FBI’s
failure to follow-up on reports about Arab men taking flight school in America
without showing any interest in learning how to land jumbo jets in the
simulators in 2000. That intelligence was not missed: Cognitive closure
brought on by over-reliance on a grand strategic cultural concept that
America was immune to domestic attack from abroad caused that intelligence
to be de-prioritized.
The conflict in Ukraine today is still massively misconstrued and misinformed
in the West. Once again, over-reliance on grand strategic culture pushes the
problem. Fascinatingly, it shows how quickly it can lead an analyst down odd
paths. First, grand strategic culture made those in the West believe there
could never be conflict between Ukraine and Russia. After all, Russia cites its
own cultural beginning from the Kievan Rus. But once the conflict in Eastern
Ukraine began in earnest, grand strategic cultural thinking quickly discarded

43 Thomas H. Hammond, “Why is the Intelligence Community so Difficult to Redesign?
Smart Practices, Conflicting Goals, and the Creation of Purpose-Based Organizations,”
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 20/3
(2007) p.419.
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this original doubt and moved on to embrace the next version: One that
assumed Russian aspiration for re-establishing empire (whatever that
actually means has never been defined of course). So, grand strategic culture
first could not predict the conflict’s emergence and then did not do a good job
at explicitly defining the purpose behind the conflict being prolonged.
When utilizing an organizational cultural approach for intelligence, however,
one is forced to look more carefully at the economic, political, and military
agreements that were already in place and meant to be enforced when the
Maidan revolution took place in Kiev and forced the Ukrainian President to
flee. Focusing on the aftermath of that removal and the consequences to
those micro-realities goes much farther in explaining how the conflict
proceeded to Crimea and across Eastern Ukraine. The failure of the West to
understand this or to continue to push a ‘grand strategic cultural analysis’
actually forces recalcitrance and indignation from the Russian side. This is
damning evidence of how grand strategic culture within Intelligence Studies
today can force analysts to think in limited, stereotypical, and highly
polarizing ways, thereby producing intelligence product that does not help
decision-makers but may actually exacerbate a conflict situation. Worse still,
in both of the examples above, the scholarly community tends to mimic this
practitioner foible. As a result, an echo chamber of sorts develops where the
academic community and intelligence community, professor and practitioner,
do not spur new ideas or challenge orthodoxies but simply reinforce the status
quo analytical mantra. Instead of each side being something of a loose check
and balance, they end up more often simply pushing forward and reinforcing
tired clichés as in-depth analysis.
This piece started with a call for a Deschian intervention in Intelligence
Studies because of the discipline’s failure to notice some of its own analytical
missteps when evaluating foreign intelligence community agencies. It also
suffered from an apparent lack of initiative to differentiate itself more fully
from Security Studies. The idea of developing an approach more akin to
corporate organizational culture, focusing on purpose-driven, complex,
dynamic reality, and allowing intelligence communities to adapt and change
needs to be pushed more to the forefront. This approach brings to
Intelligence Studies not only more accurate research but gives practitioners
better end-products. It also begins to set a separate analytical space apart
from Security Studies. This differentiation would be good for both disciplines
and would make Intelligence Studies more readily seen as a distinct and fullydeveloped academic discipline. This win-win would be most welcome not just
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in the ivory tower for intelligence but in the real-world when it comes to
ameliorating conflict.
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